




A Mathematical Perspective on How Qualia Arise 





Central to the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the enigma of how 
qualia arise from their physical correlates. It is argued that much of the explanatory 
difficulty regarding this dynamic stems from a fundamental dichotomy between the 
nature of the physical systems that give rise to qualia (the neural correlates of 
consciousness) and other physical systems. Specifically, unlike other physical systems, 
the neural correlates of consciousness have, in certain states, both quantifiable (physical) 
aspects and unquantifiable aspects (qualia). Although these two types of aspects seem 
fundamentally irreconcilable, it is argued that systems of such mixed quantifiability can 
be described (and to that extent explained) by a particular class of equations – those 
featuring singularities. In that respect, it is hypothesized that qualia correspond to 
singularities in the mathematical descriptions of certain aspects of the neural correlates 
of consciousness. This proposal may have been foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan. 
If correct, it would thread a particularly difficult needle in that it would manage to 
preserve and account for the non-quantitative aspects of experience within the 
quantitative framework of the natural sciences.  
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1 The enigma of how qualia arise from their physical correlates 
At the core of the mind-body problem is the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 
1995): 
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience ... Why is it that 
when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we 
have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? 
... It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good 
explanation of why and how it so arises. 
Our lack of an explanation of how conscious experiences (i.e., qualia) arise from 
certain physical systems represents an explanatory gap (Levine 1983) in our 
understanding of the world. The explanatory gap is central to the hard problem (Majeed 
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2015). To bridge the explanatory gap – and thereby make progress on the hard problem 
– we need an explanation of how qualia arise from their physical correlates. Figuratively, 
to bridge the explanatory gap, we need an explanation of how the conscious experience 
of pain arises from “the firing of C fibers” (Levine 1983). 
Although there are a wide variety of philosophical positions on consciousness – such 
as materialism / physicalism (e.g., Churchland 1983; Dennett 1991), substance dualism 
(e.g., Descartes 1641), property dualism (e.g., Chalmers 1996), Russellian monism (e.g., 
Russell 1927, Strawson 2006), idealism, and panpsychism – and various theories of 
consciousness from the field of neuroscience – such as integrated information theory 
(e.g. Tononi 2004) and global workspace theory (e.g., Baars 1998; Dehaene et al. 1998) 
– neither philosophy nor neuroscience presently offers a widely accepted explanation 
of how qualia arise from their physical correlates.  
Such an explanation has not arisen from the field of physics, either. Although 
physics may be capable in principle of providing a complete mechanistic account of the 
world (Weinberg 1992), it is – aside from certain theories such as orchestrated objective 
reduction (or “Orch OR”) (Penrose & Hameroff 2014) and the hypothesis that 
consciousness is a state of matter (Tegmark 2015) – largely silent on the question of 
how qualia arise from their physical correlates. This silence arose by design in order to 
avoid the profound difficulty with accounting for qualia within a physical framework. 
In Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff (2019) writes:   
[B]efore Galileo philosophers took the world to be full of … sensory qualities, things 
like colors, smells, tastes, and sounds. And it’s hard to see how sensory qualities could 
be captured in the purely quantitative language of mathematics. How could an equation 
ever explain to someone what it’s like to see red, or to taste paprika? … But if 
mathematics cannot capture the sensory qualities of matter – the redness of a tomato, 
the spiciness of paprika, the smell of flowers – then mathematics will be unable to 
completely describe nature, for it will miss out on the sensory qualities. This posed a 
severe challenge for Galileo’s hope that the “book of the universe” might be written in 
an entirely mathematical language. Galileo solved this problem with a radical 
reimagining of the material world … In Galileo’s reimagined world, material objects 
have only the following characteristics: size, shape, location, [and] motion. … The 
crucial point is that these characteristics can be captured in mathematics. Galileo did 
not believe that you could convey in mathematical language the yellow color or the 
sour taste of the lemon, but he realized that you could use a geometrical description to 
convey its size and shape. And it is possible in principle to construct a mathematical 
model to describe the motion of, and the relationships between, the lemon’s atoms and 
subatomic parts. Thus, by stripping the world of its sensory qualities (color, smell, taste, 
sound), and leaving only the minimal characteristics of size, shape, location, and 
motion, Galileo had – for the first time in history – created a material world which 
could be entirely described in mathematical language. Thus, Galileo’s universe was 
divided up into two radically different kinds of entity. On the one hand, there are 
material objects, which have only the mathematical characteristics of size, shape, 
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location, and motion. On the other hand, there are souls enjoying a rich variety of 
forms of sensory consciousness in response to the world. And the benefit of this 
picture of the world was that the material world with its minimal characteristics could 
be entirely captured in the language of mathematics. This was the birth of mathematical 
physics.  
The profound difficulty with accounting for qualia within a physical framework was 
thus a fundamental consideration in the development of the foundations of modern 
physics. Indeed, in accord with Galileo, Newton himself remarked (1671/2) that “... to 
determine ... by what modes or actions [light] produceth in our minds the phantasms 
of colours is not so easie.” 
Since qualia were set adrift in antiquity, the rising tide of scientific progress has yet 
to wash them back into the cove of the framework of the natural sciences. As discussed, 
to this day, physics remains (largely) silent as to how qualia arise from their physical 
correlates.1 In Dreams of a Final Theory, Steven Weinberg (1992) lamented this state of 
affairs, writing that, “Of all the areas … that we try to link to the principles of physics 
by arrows of explanation, it is consciousness that presents us with the greatest 
difficulty.” More recently, writing in Foundations of Physics, Adrian Kent (2018) 
recognized the continuing disconnect, noting that, “Whatever our consciousnesses are, 
they are almost certainly not identical to the physical states that give complete 
descriptions of our brains.” 
This persisting difficulty with accounting for qualia within a physical framework 
stems from the fundamental dichotomy with which Galileo originally wrestled – 
namely, the fundamental dichotomy between the world’s quantifiable (physical) aspects 
and its unquantifiable aspects (qualia). These two types of aspects seem fundamentally 
irreconcilable. How could a framework for describing the world that consists entirely 
of quantified descriptions hope to account for (much less explain), aspects of the world 
that are inherently unquantifiable?  
The nexus of this fundamental dichotomy sits at the neural correlates of 
consciousness – the particular (quantifiable) physical systems from which 
(unquantifiable) qualia arise. Unlike ordinary physical systems (which have only 
quantifiable aspects), the neural correlates of consciousness have, in certain states, both 
quantifiable (physical) aspects and unquantifiable aspects (qualia). More precisely, an 
ordinary physical system, such as a gyroscope, is a physical system for which all aspects 
of the system can be reduced to, and fully described in, quantitative terms. That is to 
say, such a physical system is a system that can be fully described by a set of, e.g., 
quantifiable fields, particles, and properties. Such a physical system is in that sense a 
system of “full quantifiability.” However, the neural correlate of, for example, the 
 
1 However, attention is building. Notably, a forthcoming special issue of the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies exploring the themes presented in Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, will 
feature papers by Sean Carroll, Carlo Rovelli, and Lee Smolin (Goff 2021).  
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experience of the quality of deep blue, is a physical system for which most aspects of 
the system can be reduced to, and fully described in, such quantitative terms, but for 
which certain aspects of the system in certain states (namely, the experience of the 
quality of deep blue) cannot be so-reduced and so-described. The deep blue qualia that 
arise from such physical system are rather ineffable aspects of such system that are 
unquantifiable, in principle. The neural correlate of the experience of the quality of deep 
blue is in that sense a system of “mixed quantifiability,” in that it has, in certain states, 
both quantifiable (physical) aspects and unquantifiable aspects (qualia).2 
Because they are inherently unquantifiable, the qualia that arise from systems of 
mixed quantifiability – such as the neural correlate of the experience of the quality of 
deep blue – are wholly unaccounted for in a framework for describing the world that 
consists entirely of quantified descriptions. Qualia have thus been “left out of the 
physicalist story” (Jackson 1982) and so the enigma of how qualia arise from their 
physical correlates persists. 
This paper will propose an explanation of how qualia arise from their physical 
correlates. The explanation to be proposed aims to preserve and account for the non-
quantitative aspects of experience within the quantitative framework of the natural 
sciences. In the spirit of Galileo’s (1623) intuition that the book of nature is written in 
the language of mathematics, and in light of the “unreasonable effectiveness” (Wigner 
1960) of mathematics in explaining other aspects of the world, the explanation to be 
proposed is mathematical. 
2 A proposed explanation of how qualia arise from their physical 
correlates 
Notwithstanding the omission of qualia from the physicalist story, the world includes 
certain physical systems (the neural correlates of consciousness) from which, in certain 
states, qualia arise. Thus, we can ask the question: Could a mathematical description of 
a physical system from which qualia arise account, in principle, for both its quantifiable 
aspects and its unquantifiable aspects?  
In order to account for both the quantifiable aspects of such a system and the 
unquantifiable aspects of such a system, we might expect that such a mathematical 
description would need to include both (a) quantified values, corresponding to the 
quantifiable (physical) aspects of such system and (b) unquantified values, 
corresponding to the unquantifiable aspects of such system (qualia). In fact, there is a 
particular class of equations that generate just such mathematical descriptions. These 
 
2 The fundamental dichotomy inherent in such systems is illuminated well by Leibniz’s (1714) mill 
argument: “[S]upposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have 
perception, we might enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces 
which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a perception.” 
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are equations featuring singularities – points at which the value of an equation becomes 
numerically undefined. Because such equations can account for both quantifiable 
aspects and unquantifiable aspects of a system, such equations could perhaps describe 
(and to that extent explain), the neural correlates of consciousness in those states from 
which qualia arise. 
To illustrate, suppose, for purposes of simplicity, that a specific firing pattern of 
interconnected neurons in the visual cortex is the neural correlate of the momentary 
experience of the quality of deep blue at a particular coordinate in the phenomenal 
visual field (such firing pattern, “NCC-DB”). NCC-DB is thus a physical system from 
which arises, seemingly inexplicably, an unquantifiable aspect in the form of a blip of deep 
blue qualia. Suppose further that this physical system has a particular aspect (Ω) that is 
described by the following equation over the course of a given instance of NCC-DB: 
Ω 1 𝑒   
where v is some variable that flips sign from negative, through zero, to positive around 
the moment of peak synchrony of an instance of NCC-DB.  
This equation features a non-divergent singularity at v = 0, which corresponds to 
the moment of peak synchrony. At that moment, Ω is numerically undefined (not 
infinite). The dynamics of Ω over the course of a given instance of NCC-DB would 
correspond to the following graph: 
 
Fig. 13 
For a given instance of NCC-DB, at all times before the moment of peak synchrony, 
Ω is an aspect of the system that is quantifiable (e.g., when v = -0.5, Ω = 0.004) and 
thus Ω can be identified as a physical aspect the system. However, at the moment of 
peak synchrony (when and for so long as v = 0), an anomaly occurs. At this moment, 
Ω is numerically undefined and is thus an aspect of the system that is unquantifiable 
and cannot be identified as a physical aspect of the system. Finally, at all times after the 
moment of peak synchrony, Ω is once again an aspect of the system that is quantifiable 
(e.g., when v = 0.5, Ω = 0.004) and thus Ω can once again be identified as a physical 
aspect of the system.  
 
3 Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.b were created with Desmos. 
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In light of these dynamics of Ω, the fact that an unquantifiable aspect arises from 
the otherwise quantifiable physical system consisting of an instance of NCC-DB is thus 
no longer inexplicable. Rather, the fact that an unquantifiable aspect arises from an 
otherwise quantifiable physical system is now intuitively explained by the presence of a 
singularity in the mathematical description of an aspect of such physical system. It is 
thus hypothesized that (unquantifiable) qualia correspond to singularities in the 
mathematical descriptions of certain aspects of the (otherwise quantifiable) neural 
correlates of consciousness. 
The proposed explanation suggests that the neural correlates of consciousness have 
at least one aspect that is described by an equation featuring a singularity. In other 
words, the proposed explanation suggests that, while most aspects of the neural 
correlates of consciousness are quantifiable in full, at least one aspect of the neural 
correlates of consciousness becomes unquantifiable in certain states. It is this particular 
dynamic that could explain how unquantifiable qualia arise from their otherwise 
quantifiable physical correlates.4 In principle, the proposed explanation seems amenable 
to falsification, and could thus qualify as a scientific hypothesis.5  
 
4 These dynamics can likewise be illustrated with more complex mathematical descriptions, such as: 
Ω 1 𝑒   
 
Fig. 2 
At all coordinates (v, w) other than (0, 0), Ω is quantifiable and can thus be identified as a physical 
aspect the system. However, at (0, 0), Ω is numerically undefined, and thus is unquantifiable, and 
cannot be identified as a physical aspect of the system. 
5 Interestingly, action potential is a central aspect of neural activity that exhibits dynamics strikingly 







However, action potential is continuously measurable. *Adapted by permission from Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Bean 2007), copyright 2007. 
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Extrapolating the hypothesized dynamic from the single blip of color qualia 
discussed in the preceding hypothetical would suggest that, at each moment, the full 
phenomenal visual field consists of a matrix of such blips of unquantifiable color qualia, 
each corresponding to a singularity in the mathematical description of an aspect of its 
neural correlate at such moment. Analogous conceptions would be suggested with 
respect to, e.g., the phenomenal auditory field.6 
The proposed explanation casts in a new light Wittgenstein’s (1953) assertion that 
“[Sensation] is not a something, but not a nothing either!” It suggests that a quale is not 
a something (i.e., a quantifiable aspect of the world that corresponds to a number in a 
mathematical description), but is not a nothing (i.e., an aspect of the world that 
corresponds to zero in a mathematical description) either. Rather, a quale is an aspect 
of the world in a twilight between somethingness, in such sense, and nothingness, in 
such sense. That is to say, a quale is an unquantifiable aspect of the world that 
corresponds to neither a number (something) nor zero (nothing), but rather to a 
singularity (an abstraction) – the proverbial “ghost in the machine” (Ryle 1949). Leibniz 
(1702) may have foreshadowed the ability of mathematics to paint this ontological 
triptych when he stated that imaginary numbers – which have strong conceptual 
parallels with singularities – are “… almost an amphibian between being and non-
being.” 
3 Limitations of, and potential objections to, the proposed explanation  
Although the proposed explanation is aspirational, it is bounded. It could explain how 
qualia arise from their physical correlates. However, aside from accounting for their 
unquantifiability, the proposed explanation would not explain qualia’s intrinsic nature 
(e.g., their blueness). Such features of qualia’s intrinsic nature need explanation, but such 
explanation is outside the scope of the proposal. That is to say, the proposal is 
circumscribed to its specific endeavor of mechanistic scientific description. The goal is 
not to generate a complete explanation of qualia, but rather to preserve and account for 
qualia within the quantitative framework of the natural sciences. 
In other words, the proposed explanation takes as a given that the world includes 
physical systems (which are quantifiable) and qualia (which are unquantifiable) and 
attempts to provide a mechanistic account of how the two are linked. For example, we 
know that (1) the world includes quantifiable physical systems that are the neural 
correlate of deep blue qualia, (2) the world includes instances of unquantifiable deep 
blue qualia, and (3) certain activity in the quantifiable physical systems that are the neural 
 
6 The proposed explanation could perhaps also support an inference about qualitative intensity. For 
example, a quale corresponding to a value of, say 2 / 0, could perhaps be inferred to have a greater 
qualitative intensity than one corresponding to a value of, say 1 / 0. Although the former is not greater 
in a quantitative sense, there is a qualitative difference between the expression of these terms that 
could correspond to a qualitative difference between the qualia to which they correspond. 
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correlate of deep blue qualia gives rise to instances of unquantifiable deep blue qualia. 
The proposed explanation does not explain (1) or (2). Rather, the proposed explanation 
takes aim at (3), given (1) and (2). That is to say, the proposed explanation offers a 
mechanistic account of how certain of the quantifiable aspects of the world (certain 
physical systems) could give rise to the unquantifiable aspects of the world (qualia), 
given that the world includes physical systems that give rise to instances of qualia.  
In that way, the proposed explanation could explain how the neural correlates of 
consciousness give rise to qualia – and allow us to predict where and when qualia do 
and do not arise – but it would tell us nothing about the intrinsic nature of qualia (other 
than that they are unquantifiable). In that respect, the proposed explanation may help 
bridge the explanatory gap, and could thus afford meaningful progress on the hard 
problem, but it is not a solution to the hard problem. Though so-limited, if correct, the 
proposed explanation would be a significant result.  
In Dreams of a Final Theory, Weinberg (1992) discusses what we might reasonably 
hope to achieve in terms of our understanding how qualia arise from their physical 
correlates. He writes: 
Suppose … that we will come to understand the objective correlatives to consciousness 
in terms of physics (including chemistry) … It is not unreasonable to hope that when 
the objective correlatives to consciousness have been explained, somewhere in our 
explanations we shall be able to recognize something … that corresponds to our experience of 
consciousness itself, to what Gilbert Ryle has called “the ghost in the machine.” That may 
not be an explanation of consciousness, but it will be pretty close. (emphasis added) 
The hope expressed here seems to be that there will ultimately be something in our 
physical explanations of the neural correlates of consciousness that, even if such thing 
does not fully explain qualia, it will at least intuitively correspond to qualia. Our present 
physical explanations do not contain anything that intuitively corresponds to qualia, 
because, by design, there is nothing unquantifiable in such explanations to which 
unquantifiable qualia could conceivably correspond. There are no places, in other 
words, in our present explanations where we can recognize something that could 
conceivably correspond to the ineffable ghost in the machine. On the contrary, the 
proposed explanation does contain something – singularities – that, as discussed, do 
not fully explain consciousness, but, due to their shared unquantifiability, could 
intuitively be taken to correspond to qualia. Such singularities could thus serve as places 
in our explanations where we could recognize something that could intuitively 
correspond to the ineffable ghost in the machine. In that respect, because the proposed 
explanation is one that contains something that could intuitively correspond to qualia, 
it could meet Weinberg’s criteria for what we might reasonably hope to achieve in terms 
of our understanding how qualia arise from their physical correlates.  
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It may be objected, however, that the proposed explanation provides a recipe for 
generating explanations of any aspects of the world that seem unquantifiable but are 
correlated with something quantifiable. This, it could be argued, renders the proposed 
explanation too general in nature to be genuinely explanatory with respect to qualia. 
However, while certain aspects of the world (e.g., complex biological systems) are 
unquantifiable in practice (due to extraordinary complexity), they are nevertheless 
quantifiable in principle, as, e.g., biological facts, ultimately reduce to physical facts, and 
physical facts are quantifiable in principle. On the contrary, qualia (as distinguished 
from their physical correlates) are unquantifiable not just in practice, but rather in 
principle. In that respect, the sort of quantitative descriptions that could in principle 
fully describe all aspects of, e.g., complex biological systems (even if such descriptions 
elude us in practice), could not fully describe the physical systems from which qualia 
arise, since such quantitative descriptions would not account for the aspects of such 
systems that are unquantifiable in principle (namely, their qualia). However, the 
inclusion of equations featuring singularities in the descriptions of such physical systems 
could close this gap by allowing such descriptions to account for both the quantifiable 
(physical) aspects of such systems and the unquantifiable aspects of such systems 
(qualia). Thus, while singularities need not be appealed to for, e.g., biological 
explanations (which present problems of quantification in practice), they have real 
explanatory utility with respect to qualia (which present problems of quantification in 
principle).  
It may be further objected that singularities are present in the mathematical 
descriptions of certain aspects of physical systems from which qualia do not arise, such 
as phase transitions, black holes, and quantum fields. However, in such cases, such 
singularities are generally not taken to actually correspond to real aspects of the world, 
but rather they are taken only to be mathematical artifacts of idealized equations or 
signs of breakdowns of the applicability of the equations themselves (Batterman 2011). 
On the contrary, according to the proposed explanation, the singularities hypothesized 
in the mathematical descriptions of certain aspects of the neural correlates of 
consciousness would be taken to actually correspond to real aspects of the world 
(namely, qualia). This is because, contrary to ordinary physical systems, the inclusion of 
equations featuring singularities in the descriptions of certain aspects of the neural 
correlates of consciousness would have explanatory utility in that it would allow such 
descriptions to account for both the quantifiable (physical) aspects of such systems and 
the unquantifiable aspects of such systems (qualia). Thus, while singularities are 
generally sought to be avoided in mathematical descriptions of ordinary physical 
systems, they offer real explanatory utility with respect to the physical systems that give 
rise to qualia. Such utility would be consistent with the notion (Batterman 2011) that 
mathematical singularities could in principle serve as sources of information about the 
world that entail neither inconsistency nor inadequacy. 
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4 Was the proposed explanation foreshadowed by Ramanujan? 
The proposed explanation of how qualia arise from their physical correlates may have 
been foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan – the early-20th century mathematician 
widely regarding as one history’s greatest geniuses. Ramanujan generated a multitude of 
novel and important results. Certain of his insights were recorded in cryptic terms and 
were not immediately appreciated; others remain shrouded in mystery. Ramanujan 
reported that some of his deepest mathematical insights came in dreams (Kanigel 1992).  
In the context of this paper, it is particularly interesting that Ramanujan recounted 
dreams (Kanigel 1992) in which he was:  
[V]isited by images of his own abdomen as a kind of mathematical appendage with 
singularities, points in space marked by indefinable mathematical surges ... Intense pain 
might show up at x = 1, half as much pain at x = -1, and so on.  
The parallels between this anecdote and the proposed explanation of how qualia arise 
from their physical correlates are striking. In accord with the proposed explanation, this 
anecdote evokes the notion that qualia (“pain”) of varying qualitative intensities 
(“intense pain … half as much pain”) correspond to singularities (“points in space 
marked by indefinable mathematical surges”) in the mathematical description 
(“mathematical appendage”) of a physical system (“abdomen”).  
5 Concluding thoughts 
The proposed explanation of how qualia arise from their physical correlates could 
account for a dynamic that otherwise seems inexplicable – that in which unquantifiable 
qualia arise from their otherwise quantifiable physical correlates.  
The proposed explanation would have explanatory power that is lacking from 
theories of consciousness that appeal to notions like complexity, interconnectivity, and 
information processing (e.g., integrated information theory). A highly complex and 
interconnected physical system – no matter how complex and interconnected and no 
matter how much information it processes – is still a system that has only (highly 
complex and interconnected) quantifiable aspects. Such a system has differences from 
other systems in degree (e.g., of complexity and interconnectedness), but not in type 
(e.g., of quantifiability), and thus has no room, so to speak, for unquantifiable qualia. 
However, a highly complex and interconnected physical system with certain aspects 
described by equations featuring singularities is more – it is a system that has, in certain 
states, both (highly complex and interconnected) quantifiable aspects and unquantifiable 
aspects. This sort of physical system – that has, in certain states, both quantifiable 
aspects and unquantifiable aspects – is just the sort of enigmatic physical system that 
the neural correlates of consciousness are in those states from which qualia arise.  
The proposed explanation would also avoid what is arguably the most significant 
drawback of theories of consciousness that appeal to notions like complexity, 
11 
interconnectivity, and information processing. Because things like complexity, 
interconnectivity, and information processing are in some sense ubiquitous (and 
regress, in varying degrees, to the microphysical level), there is no clear way for such 
theories to distinguish between physical systems that should give rise to qualia and 
physical systems that should not (or to identify within a given physical system a 
threshold above which qualia should arise, and below which they should not). Thus, 
theories of consciousness such as integrated information theory are generally taken to 
entail panpsychism (Koch 2012). The proposed explanation does not suffer from these 
explanatory challenges. According to the proposed explanation, qualia arise from 
precisely those physical systems – and only those physical systems – that have aspects 
described by equations featuring singularities in certain states. And within that subset 
of physical systems, qualia arise precisely when – and only when – certain aspects of 
such physical systems correspond to singularities in such equations; at all other times, 
qualia do not arise from such physical systems. Unlike theories of consciousness that 
entail panpsychism, this account dovetails well with our intuitive notions about the 
dynamics of consciousness. Namely, not only do particular qualia come and go, but 
under certain conditions (e.g., general anesthesia), the curtain closes on the “Cartesian 
theatre” (Dennett 1991) altogether. Unlike the “whisper of sourceless ventilation” 
inside an office building (Foster Wallace 2011), qualia are not omnipresent. The 
proposed explanation accommodates this notion, as it predicts not only when qualia 
arise, but, equally as importantly, when they do not arise.  
The proposed explanation suggests that, unlike other physical systems (which are 
systems of full quantifiability), the neural correlates of conscious are systems of mixed 
quantifiability in those states from which qualia arise. In such states, certain aspects of 
the neural correlates of consciousness that were quantifiable, and could thus be 
identified as physical, become unquantifiable, and can thus be inferred to be qualia. This 
dynamic seems to accord with Chalmers’ (1996) notion that “Perhaps the physical and 
the phenomenal will turn out to be two different aspects of a single encompassing kind, 
in something like the way that matter and energy turn out to be two aspects of a single 
kind.”  
In addition to its theoretical implications, the proposed explanation could have 
practical implications:  
 First, the proposed explanation suggests that qualia come on the scene 
precisely when computation fails to provide quantifiable information (at 
singularities). This suggests a potential extension of the project which pursues 
an evolutionary explanation of qualia as a means for dealing with 
computationally intractable problems via novel means.i 
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 Second, the proposed explanation suggests that the consciousness of a given 
physical system could be experimentally inferred (and to that extent verified) 
via the detection of anomalous gaps in the measurability of certain aspects of 
such system.  
 Third, the proposed explanation could illuminate a path towards artificial 
consciousness, via the engineering of physical systems designed to generate 
such anomalies.  
According to Chalmers (1996), we should expect the fundamental explanations in a 
theory of consciousness to be “simple and elegant.” The proposed explanation meets 
this expectation on both counts: it is simple, in that the equations that form its 
conceptual foundation involve only two-variable algebra, and it is elegant, in that it 
explains an enigmatic dynamic in an intuitive manner.   
Although it is not a solution to the hard problem, the proposed explanation could 
help bridge the explanatory gap and thereby afford meaningful progress on the hard 
problem. If correct, the proposed explanation would thread a particularly difficult 
needle in that it would manage to preserve and account for the non-quantitative aspects 
of experience within the quantitative framework of the natural sciences.  
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